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ARKANSAS
Ginardi v. Frontier Gas Services, No. 4:11-CV-00420-BRW; 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis
54845 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 19, 2012).
[CLASS ACTION SUIT, AIR POLLUTION]

Named Plaintiffs filed for class certification in suit against Frontier Gas Services,
and other natural gas production service providers, alleging air, groundwater, soil, and
noise pollution from natural gas compressor and transmissions stations. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a). Petitioners proposed the class of Arkansas citizens living or owning property
within one mile of Defendants’ compressor stations in bringing tort claims sounding in
nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability. The District Court denied class
certification citing Plaintiffs’ failure to establish that class action litigation satisfied the
predominance and superiority requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
Petitioners’ proposed class met the threshold requirements for class certification
in establishing that all legal and factual questions arose from the alleged impact on
surrounding properties of emissions and noise pollution from compressor stations owned
by Defendants. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). However, the court held that a prima facie showing
of the underlying elements of liability would require highly individualized evidence of
causation and damages. As distinguished from toxic-tort claims arising from a single
incident in which a sole proximate cause applies equally to each potential class member,
Plaintiffs’ claims stem from a long term toxic tort requiring individual assessments which
predominate over common issues. The need to assess individual evidence was held to
defeat the efficiency goals implicit to the superiority requirement of FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3).

Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20697, No.1:11-cv-44-DPM,
No.1:11-cv-45-DPM, (E. D. Ark., Feb. 17, 2012) (consolidating Berry v. Southwestern
Energy Co., 11CV0045 (E.D. Ark., May 17, 2011).
[CLASS ACTION SUIT; STRICT LIABILITY; LONE PINE ORDER]

Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief pursuant to motion for class
certification for tort claims arising out of alleged groundwater contamination from
Defendants’ oil and gas production activities. Petitioners’ tort claims sound in nuisance,
trespass, negligence, and strict liability. Groundwater testing showing contamination with
alpha methylstyrene, methane, and hydrogen sulfide provided evidence for trespass and
nuisance claims alleging fluid migration from hydraulic fracturing operations. An
amended complaint was filed following the District Court’s decision that Plaintiffs’
complaint failed to plead facts with sufficient definiteness and particularity to meet
plausibility standard. Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20697,
No.1:11-cv-44-DPM (E. D. Ark., Feb. 17, 2012) citing pleading standard of Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Pl.’s Amended Compl.
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The February 2012 decision denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
strict liability claim on the grounds that the factual record was not adequately developed
to determine whether hydraulic fracturing was ultra hazardous as a matter of law. Citing
Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d. 506 (M.D. Pa. 2012) and Berish
v. Southwestern Energy Production Co, 763 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M. D. Pa. 2011). In its July
2012 decision the court also dismissed Southwestern Energy’s motion for a Lone Pine
order. Final action pending.

Hill v. Southwestern Energy Co., No.12-600, 2012 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 12912, 2012
Dist. Ct. Pleadings Lexis 248 (E. D. Ark., Oct. 4, 2012).
[CLASS ACTION SUIT; TRESPASS, SDWA]

Plaintiffs filed complaint against oil and gas development corporations operating
oilfield waste wells permitted under the SDWA as Class II Disposal Wells. Petitioners
allege that horizontal migration of disposed hydraulic fracturing flowback water
throughout rock formation reservoirs constitutes a permanent trespass against property
owners owning surface land above the reservoir space. The proposed class includes all
property owners within a three mile radius of the disposal wells. Petitioners also claim
that hydraulic fracturing waste fluids are of a toxic and hazardous nature warranting
strictly liability.
Plaintiffs’ RICO claims against Defendants argue that Southwestern Energy,
Chesapeake Energy, and XTO Energy formed an “association in fact” conspiring to
defraud Arkansas citizens of the proper value of land. 18 U.S.C. 1951. Petitioners allege
that, despite Defendants’ knowledge that standard oil and gas leases do not contemplate
the injection and permanent storage of oilfield wastes upon lands of the lessor, the
association failed to make appropriate payments. Each named plaintiff seeks two million
dollars in compensatory damages and fifteen million dollars in punitive damages.
Petitioners seek injunctive relief in the form of monitoring oilfield waste wells for
fluid migration, replevin of profits, and damages on behalf of the proposed class of
Arkansas citizens, residents, and property owners living or owning property within three
mile radius of disposal wells. The action is pending.

Scoggins v. Cudd Pumping Services, Inc., No. 4-11 cv678 JMM-BD, 2011 WL 4217619
(E.D. Ark. filed Sep. 12, 2011).
[AIR POLLUTION]

Plaintiff, Tina Scoggins on behalf of two minor grandchildren, filed suit with
claims sounding in tort against Defendants Cudd Pumping Services and other natural gas
development service companies for air contamination as a result of hydraulic fracturing
operations. Petitioner alleges that contamination stems from Defendant’s use of the
carcinogenic or poisonous compounds benzene, xylene, and methylene chloride in
7

hydraulically fracturing three natural gas wells within two-hundred and fifty feet of the
Scoggins residence. Scoggins brings tort claims sounding in strict liability, nuisance,
trespass, and negligence. The complaint seeks injunctive relief, in the form of medical
monitoring for cancer, twenty-million dollars in damages for acute susceptibility of minor
children to cancer stemming from benzene exposure, and fifty-million dollars in punitive
damages. Action pending.

Hiser v. XTO Energy Inc., 2012 WL 3542009, No. 4:11-cv-00517 KGB (E.D. Ark., Aug.
14, 2012).
[SEISMIC VIBRATIONS]

Plaintiff Hiser filed suit against XTO Energy bringing tort claims for damages to
her home allegedly caused by vibrations from Defendants nearby drilling operations.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied by the court which held that Hiser
had provided sufficient circumstantial evidence in the form of lay testimony to meet
pleading burden on claims of negligence, nuisance, and trespass.
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CALIFORNIA
Community Health Councils, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, No. BS118018, (CA
Super. Ct. Los Angeles County Jul. 15, 2011) Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release.
Consolidating City of Culver v. County of Los Angeles, No. BS118023; Concerned
Citizens of South Central Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, No. BS118039; Citizen’s
Coalition for a Safe Community v. County of Los Angeles, No. BS118056.
[MUNICIPAL ZONING POWERS]

Environmental advocacy organizations filed suit for review of Los Angeles
County’s approval of Baldwin Hills Community Zoning Code Amendments, and related
Final Environmental Impact Report, for proposed oil and gas development on Inglewood
oil field. Settlement Agreement entered into by the environmental organizations, Los
Angeles County, and Plains Exploration & Production Company (PXP) imposes
environmental and procedural requirements on PXP’s horizontal drilling operations and
development generally. In addition, the settlement requires the County to regulate
technical aspects of well drilling and capping, the total number of wells, and complete a
Health Assessment and Environmental Justice study. Settlement Agreement and Mutual
Release (Jul. 15, 2011) online access at
Planning.LACounty.gov/assets/upi/project/bh_settlement-agreement_20110715.pdf .
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COLORADO
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission v. City of Longmont, No. 2012-0730
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder County, filed Jul. 30, 2012).
[PREEMPTION]

Petitioner Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) filed for
declaratory relief against portions of the City of Longmont’s Oil and Gas Ordinance
claiming preemption by the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act . CITY OF
LONGMONT, COLO., ORDINANCES O-2012-25; CRS §34-60-100 et. seq. (as amended
2007). The COGCC’s complaint alleges that provisions establishing standards and
requirements which exceed those set by COGCC regulations are preempted. Challenged
provisions regulate well spacing, the use of horizontal drilling, setbacks, chemical
disclosures, and water and wildlife protection standards. The COGCC argues that the
City’s assertion of authority to impose additional operational requirements on drillers
defeats the substantive resource conservation and environmental goals of the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act and is therefore preempted. Action pending.

Evenson v. Antero Resources Inc., 11CV5118 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 17, 2012).
[CLASS ACTION]

Petitioners, multiple homeowners in the Battlement Mesa Planned Unit
Development, sought class action certification for all property owners and residents of
the Battlement Mesa PUD in filing for injunctive relief blocking Antero Resources
planned oil and gas development within Battlement Mesa.
The Colorado District Court in Denver County granted Defendant’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction citing Plaintiffs’ failure to state a
remediable claim. COLO. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5). Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust statutorily
prescribed administrative remedies before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission prior to filing suit in court was fatal to their claim for injunctive relief.
C.R.S. §24-4-106; C.R.S. §34-60-114. Petitioners’ tort claims were dismissed for failure
to properly plead a claim for the alleged release of fumes from an incident at a well pad
site in 2010.

Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp., No. 2011CV2218 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 9, 2012).
[LONE PINE ORDER; GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION]

Strudley family filed suit in tort alleging air and water contamination from
Defendants, gas production company and well service providers, operation of gas wells
within one mile of Strudley residence and water supply well. Petitioners relocated
10

roughly five months from start of well construction and cited contamination from
Defendants’ improper drilling methods, ineffective well casings, and flaring of toxic and
hazardous gases as prompting their relocation. The Strudleys brought claims for
negligence, negligence per se, nuisance, strict liability, and sought medical monitoring
trust fund. On Defendants’ motion, the court issued a Modified Case Management Order
requiring Strudleys make a prima facie showing of exposure and causation prior to
discovery. In weighing the burden of a Lone Pine showing against efficiency concerns
the court cited the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission’s investigation
concluding that the Strudleys’ water supply well was not affected by oil and gas
operations and Defendants’ testimony that operations were in compliance with applicable
regulations.
Following submission pursuant to Lone Pine order, the District Court dismissed
the case with prejudice for Plaintiffs’ failure to establish prima facie elements of
exposure, injury, and general and specific causation. Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L33606-85 1986 WL 635707 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 1986). Although Plaintiffs’ experts
concluded that the environmental and health evidence merited further substantive
discovery, the court ruled that the lack of data or expert analysis establishing “with any
level of probability that a causal connection” exists between alleged injuries and exposure
to Defendants’ drilling activities was fatal to Strudleys’ request for additional discovery.
Central to the ruling that Plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing on the
element of exposure was the conflict between the timing of the water sample used by the
COGCC and the Plaintiffs. In ruling that Plaintiffs had not made a prima facie showing of
the elements of causation, the court highlighted that experts had not established whether
the alleged hazardous substances can cause the types of illnesses affecting Plaintiffs to
show general causation; had not established the dose, duration, and location of Plaintiffs’
exposure; or identified Plaintiffs’ injuries according to medically recognized diagnoses.
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NEW YORK
Jeffrey v. Ryan, No. CA2012-001254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Binghamton Co. Oct. 2, 2012).
[MORATORIUM; PREEMPTION]

Petitioners, with various development and land interests in oil and gas
development, sought administrative review of and declaratory relief from Binghamton
City Council’s adoption of Local Law 11-006 banning oil and gas exploration and
extraction for a period of two years. BINGHAMTON, N.Y., ORDINANCES ch. 250 (2011).
Plaintiffs characterized 11-006 as either a procedurally deficient zoning regulation or,
alternatively, an illegitimate moratorium on development. Defendant City of Binghamton
claimed that 11-006 was not a zoning regulation but rather a legitimate exercise of
municipal police powers to protect public health and safety. The Binghamton County
Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the claim for
declaratory relief holding 11-006 to be an illegitimate moratorium. In ruling against the
City the court drew a clear distinction between the illegitimate form of Local Law 11-006
and the legitimacy of general municipal land use regulation.
Judge Lebous approvingly cited the decisions in Anschutz Exploration Corp. v.
Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458 (2012) and Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of
Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (2012) for holding that state Environmental Conservation
Law 23-0303(2) does not supersede local governments’ right to regulate land use. N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. (1981). Elements of the procedural history and the content of 11-006
led Judge Lebous to characterize the law as a moratorium distinct from zoning
regulations of the type upheld in Dryden and Middlefield. and not a zoning regulation.
The court held that the three part test for a moratorium was not met by the City of
Binghamton. First, Binghamton City was unable to demonstrate dire necessity as state
regulations necessary for gas E& E activity to commence had not been published.
Second, statements made by City representatives during the passage of 11-006, and the
City’s failure to present evidence of a dire threat to the court, demonstrated that gas
drilling was not known by the City to present a serious threat to health or safety. Third,
Binghamton failed to articulate a plan to alleviate or study the supposed threat of gas
drilling. In the absence of a plan to alleviate or investigate the supposed threat of natural
gas drilling, Judge Lebous found the designated two year sunset period arbitrary and
considered it to be conclusive evidence that the threat perceived by City representatives
was not sufficiently grave to justify the exercise of municipal police powers through a
moratorium.

Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
[PREEMPTION; MUNICIPAL LAND USE POWERS]

Plaintiff Anschutz Exploration Company, O&G developer holding mineral leases
in Dryden, sought declaratory relief for amendments to the Dryden Zoning Ordinance
12

prohibiting oil and gas development. DRYDEN, N.Y., ZONING ORDINANCE art. XXI §
2104, app. A (Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Zoning Amendments]. Anschutz claimed that
the Zoning Amendments violated the supersession clause of the state Oil, Gas, Solution,
and Mining Law. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §23-0303(2) (1981). In a case of first
impression, the Tompkins County Supreme Court upheld the Zoning Amendments as a
legitimate exercise of municipal land use powers not intended to be preempted by state
regulation of oil and gas operations.
Judge Rumsey followed precedent established in judicial interpretation of the
New York Mined Land Reclamation Law’s preemption clause which contained language
that closely paralleled the language in the supersession clause at issue. Matter of Frew
Run Gravel Prods. v. Town of Carroll, 71 N.Y.2d 126 (1987), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §23-2703(2) (1976). Applying the distinction drawn in Matter of Frew Run between
ordinances that regulate property uses generally versus ordinances regulating operations
of a particular industry, Judge Rumsey held that the Zoning Amendments legitimately
regulated land uses pursuant to municipal police powers and did not fall within the scope
of preemption intended by 23-0303(2).

Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2012).
[PREEMPTION; MUNICIPAL LAND USE POWERS]

Petitioner Cooperstown Holstein Corporation, O&G Developer, sought
declaratory relief against a Local Law amending the Middlefield Zoning Ordinance to
prohibit O&G E&E. A Local Law Repealing the Town of Middlefield Zoning Ordinance
and Adopting the Town of Middlefield Zoning Law (Jun. 14) [hereinafter Zoning Law]
(codified at MIDDLEFIELD, N.Y., TOWN OF MIDDLEFIELD ZONING LAW art. V §A, art. II
§B(7)-B(8) (2011)). Cooperstown alleged that the Zoning Amendments violated the
supersession clause of the state Oil, Gas, Solution, and Mining Law. N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV. LAW §23-0303(2) (1981). The Otsego County Supreme Court upheld the Local
Law as a legitimate municipal land use regulation not preempted by state regulation of oil
and gas operations.
Judge Cerio looked to legislative history of ECL 23-0303(2) in concluding that
the regulation of oil and gas development, vested in the Department of Environmental
Conservation, was intended to be limited to control over the manner and method of
mineral extraction. The court characterized state versus municipal control over oil and
gas development as following a “how vs. where” distinction which allowed
municipalities to control where drilling occurred through land use regulations.

Weiden Lake Property Owners v. Klansky, No. 3885-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sullivan County,
Aug. 2011).
[PROTECTIVE COVENANTS]
13

Weiden Lake Property Owners Association filed for declaration of rights and
legal relations seeking to bar natural gas development by Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation
in the Weiden Lake Community pursuant to lease with Defendant, property owner in the
Community, Klansky. Plaintiffs argued that Klansky violated two Protective Covenants,
entered into by all property owners in the Community, banning commercial activity and
limiting development to single-family residential use, agriculture, and recreation. The
Supreme Court in Sullivan County held that the Protective Covenants banned drilling for
natural gas and permanently enjoined Cabot Oil from development on Klansky’s parcel.
Cabot’s cross-motions against Klansky seeking rescission of the lease were dismissed
with the court citing evidence that Cabot was on notice of the unambiguous Protective
Covenants barring development which governed Klansky’s land at time of leasing.

U.S. Energy Development Corp., No.11-57, R9-20111104-150 (N.Y. Department of
Environmental Conservation, filed Jan. 24, 2012) (requesting adjudicative hearing before
administrative law judge of Office of Hearings and Mediation Services).
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION]

New York Department of Environmental Conservation filed for adjudication for
continuing violations of Orders on Consent entered into with U.S. Energy Development
Corporation for water pollution violations in New York stemming from interstate effects
of oil and gas drilling operations in Pennsylvania. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW arts. 3,17.
Action pending.

Sierra Club v. Village of Painted Post, No. 2012-0810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Steuben County
filed Jun. 25, 2012).
[NEPA]

Sierra Club and other environmental organizations petitioned for administrative
review of the Village of Painted Post’s property lease with transporter Wellsboro &
Corning Railroad for railroad facility intended to transport Village well water to
hydraulic fracturing operations. Petitioners claim violations of the New York State
Environmental Quality Review Act, failure to obtain a Water Transport Permit from the
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, failure to obtain permits
from the Federal Railroad Administration, and NEPA violations. Action pending.

Environmental Working Group v. New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation, No. 5159-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County filed Sep. 17, 2012).
[FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUESTS]

The Environmental Working Group petitions to challenge denials of Freedom of
Information Law (FOIL) requests by the New York Department of Environmental
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Conservation and Governor Cuomo’s Office. PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW § 89(4)(b) providing
for judicial review of agency’s action. Petitioners allege that Respondents withheld
records that must be released under FOIL documenting communications between oil and
gas development companies and Defendants regarding hydraulic fracturing and proposed
regulations. Environmental Working Group (EWG) cites evidence from records received
in response to initial FOIL requests to demonstrate that industry members were given
undue influence on the regulatory process. The complaint cites evidence that natural gas
drilling industry representatives received draft regulations weeks before the public and
that documents received in response to the initial FOIL request demonstrate that a
diligent search for requested documents had not been performed. EWG seeks
invalidation of respondents denials of FOIL requests and related appeals, a declaration
that records were withheld by respondents, and court order requiring production of
specific documents identified by petitioner. Action pending.

In Re: Chesapeake Appalachia LLC, 839 F. Supp.2d 544, No. 3:11-CV-308 (N.D. N.Y.
Mar. 20, 2012).
[FORCE MAJEURE]

Plaintiffs, two-hundred and fifty-nine landowners in New York, petitioned for
declaratory judgment against Chesapeake Appalachia and Statoil clarifying the terms of
oil and gas leases, separately entered into, with Defendants. Petitioners claimed that
leases had expired and could not be extended through application of the force majeure
clause and that Defendants failed to make prescribed payments. Defendants’ motion to
compel arbitration, pursuant to a clause included in the lease agreements, was granted by
the District Court. The court held that the arbitration clause was valid and that
Defendants alleged failure to make payments, as well as other disputed issues, were
within the scope of the clause.

Aukema v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2012 WL 5522832, No. 3:11-CV-00489 (N.D.
N.Y., Nov. 15, 2012)
[FORCE MAJEURE]

Plaintiffs, representing fifty oil and gas leases entered into with Defendant
production companies, sought a declaratory judgment that lease terms have not been
extended by de facto moratorium on hydraulic fracturing imposed by New York EIS
process. Defendants argued that the de facto moratorium constituted a force majeure that
extends the primary lease term or alternatively that the moratorium justified extension of
lease terms according to the doctrine of frustration of purpose. The District Court held
that Defendants’ inability to conduct hydraulic fracturing operations did not frustrate the
purpose of the leases and that force majeure was neither applicable nor served to extend
the leases. Plaintiffs received declaratory judgment that the leases terminated at the end
of their primary term and that Defendants cannot invoke force majeure or the doctrine of
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frustration of purpose as leases covered all forms of oil and gas exploration and the
moratorium was limited to horizontal high volume hydraulic fracturing.

Wiser v. Enervest Operating, LLC, 803 F. Supp. 2d 109 (N.D. N.Y., Mar. 20, 2011).
[FORCE MAJEURE]

Plaintiffs, property owners party to oil and gas leases with Defendants, sought
declaratory judgment that lease terms have not been extended, nor delay rental payments
excused, by virtue of de facto moratorium on hydraulic fracturing. Defendants moved for
summary judgment arguing that the de facto moratorium on hydraulic fracturing
instituted by the New York EIS process constituted a force majeure extending the lease
terms and excused contractually required delay rental payments. The District Court
granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment holding that Defendants’ failure to
make delay rental payments invalidated lease agreements.
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PENNSYLVANIA
Range Resources v. Salem Township, 964 A.2d 869 (Pa., 2009).
[PREEMPTION; MUNICIPAL OIL AND GAS REGULATIONS]

Appellant Salem Township sought review of lower courts’ interpretation of the
preemptive scope of the Oil and Gas Act resulting in the wholesale invalidation of the
Township’s Ordinance regulating oil and gas well operations and associated surface and
land development. SALEM TOWNSHIP, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE, Appendix B (2006)
(adopting regulations into Zoning Ordinance); Great Lakes Energy Partners v. Salem
Township, 931 A.2d 101 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 2007)(en banc) holding Ordinance preempted
by Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act under express and conflict preemption doctrine; Act of
December 19, 1984, P.L. 1140 (as amended, 58 P.S. §601.602)(hereinafter Oil and Gas
Act). Appellees, oil and gas producers, maintained that the Ordinance was preempted by
the Oil and Gas Act for overlap with the Act’s regulatory features and goals. On appeal
the Township requested review of each Ordinance provision individually, arguing that the
regulation of aspects of oil and gas development which do not flow directly from well
operations such as access road, gas transmission lines, and water disposal requirements,
are not preempted by the Oil and Gas Act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the
wholesale invalidation of the Ordinance as preempted by the Oil and Gas Act under both
express and conflict preemption doctrine.
The court characterized the Ordinance as an attempt to comprehensively regulate
oil and gas development in the municipality in violation of the express preemptive
language of §602 and in conflict with the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the Oil
and Gas Act. Although some regulatory features of the Ordinance did not overlap with
the Oil and Gas Act, the court held that these provisions were bound with Salem
Townships illegitimate assertion of unlimited discretion over oil and gas development in
violation of conflict preemption doctrine. The court distinguished the Zoning Ordinance
upheld in companion case Huntley & Huntley v. Borough of Oakmont stating that
Oakmont’s zoning ordinance was limited to controlling the location of wells in line with
established municipal land use powers.

Huntley & Huntley Inc. v. Borough Council of the Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855
(Pa., 2009).
[PREEMPTION; MUNICIPAL LAND USE POWERS]

Appellant Borough of Oakmont petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for
review of the invalidation of portions of the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance regulating well
site locations. BOROUGH OF OAKMONT, PA., Zoning Code (hereinafter Zoning
Ordinance); Huntley & Huntley v. Borough Council of Borough of Oakmont, 929 A.2d.
1252 (Pa. Commw. 2007) holding Pennsylvania Oil & Gas Act preempts portions of
Borough of Oakmont’s Zoning Ordinance restricting well site locations). The central
issue on appeal was whether provisions of the Zoning Ordinance requiring local approval
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for natural gas drilling in residential zones was preempted by the Pennsylvania Oil and
Gas Act’s preemption clause. Act of December 19, 1984, P.L. 1140 (as amended, 58 P.S.
§§601.602) (hereinafter Act). Appellee Huntley & Huntley argued that the Act expressly
preempted municipal regulation of technical features of oil and gas operations, including
well site location, and that local regulations seeking to accomplish the same purposes as
the Act were implicitly preempted under conflict preemption doctrine. In a companion
case to Range Resources v. Salem Township, the Supreme Court upheld the Zoning
Ordinance’s limitations on mineral extraction in residential zones against Huntley’s claim
that the Oil and Gas Act preempted local regulation on express and conflict preemption
grounds.
The court held that the preemption clause was not total. While municipal
regulation of the technical aspects of oil and gas well operations, such as well permitting
and site restoration, are foreclosed the preemption clause did not reach traditional
municipal restrictions on well site location. Despite some overlap between the goals of
the Zoning Ordinance and the goals enumerated in the Act the traditional municipal
zoning interests in preserving the character of residential neighborhoods and encouraging
compatible land uses was seen as sufficiently different from Pennsylvania’s interest in
efficient and unified development.

Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct.,
Jul. 26, 2012).
[PREEMPTION; MUNICIPAL LAND USE POWERS]

Plaintiffs filed for pre-enforcement declaratory and injunctive relief against
Pennsylvania’s Act 13. 58 Pa. C.S. §§2301-3504 (2012). Petitioners alleged that the
requirement that municipal zoning ordinances be amended to allow oil and gas operations
in all zoning districts violates substantive due process by forcing municipalities to act in
derogation of comprehensive zoning plans. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 58 Pa. C.S.
§3304. Plaintiffs also sought relief from a provision preempting municipal regulation of
environmental issues related to oil and gas development, a provision allowing
corporations to take property for natural gas storage reservoirs, and a provision
delegating authority to grant waivers to setback requirements to the Department of
Environmental Protection. 58 Pa. C.S. §§3303, 3214(a), 3215(a) (2012). The
Commonwealth Court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs on four counts enjoining
the State from requiring municipalities to allow oil and gas development in all zoning
districts and invalidated the delegation of setback waiver authority to the DEP.
The majority characterized the §3304 requirement that municipalities allow oil
and gas development in all zoning districts as akin to a “spot use” for oil and gas
development. Requiring local governments to allow incompatible land uses was held to
violate the substantive due process rights of neighboring property owners who made
investments in reliance on protections afforded by comprehensive zoning plans. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; citing City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725
(1995). The court also invalidated §3215(b) for failing to provide adequate guidance for
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the exercise of authority delegated to the DEP to waive setback requirements. PA. CONST.
art. II, §1; Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d. 867 (Pa. 2005).
Section 3303, preempting municipalities from enacting environmental regulations
related to oil and gas development, was upheld as a legitimate limitation on municipal
powers under the Municipal Powers Code. 53 P.S. §10301(a)(6). The court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ takings claims on jurisdictional and procedural grounds. 26 Pa. C.S. §306
exclusive method to challenge power to take property is the filing of a preliminary
objection to a declaration of taking.

Penneco Oil Company Inc. v. County of Fayette, 4 A.3d 722 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 2010).
[PREEMPTION; MUNICIPAL LAND USE POWERS]

Appellants, oil and gas producers, petitioned for invalidation of the Fayette
County Zoning Ordinance for violating the preemption clause in Pennsylvania Oil and
Gas Act. FAYETTE COUNTY, PA., Zoning Ordinance (2006). Petitioners challenged a
Zoning Ordinance requirement that oil and gas wells in certain zones receive a permitted
use or special exception certificate arguing the certificate paralleled state regulation
through well permits in contravention of the express preemption clause of the Oil and
Gas Act. The Commonwealth Court held that the Fayette County Ordinance did not
violate either the express preemption clause of the Act or conflict preemption doctrine
under precedent established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Huntley & Huntley
Inc. v. Borough Council of the Borough of Oakmont. 965 A.2d. 869 (2009).
The court held that the few provisions of the Zoning Ordinance which related to
oil and gas wells were sufficiently broad and sufficiently constrained the County’s
discretionary authority over oil and gas development to avoid characterization as a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. Despite some overlap with the purposes of the Oil and
Gas Act, the central objective of the Zoning Ordinance to encourage beneficial and
compatible land uses was upheld as consistent with municipal land use powers not in
derogation of the preemption clause of the Oil and Gas Act.

MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources LLC v. Cecil Township, No. 430 MD 2012
(Pa. Commw. Ct. filed June 29, 2012).
[ACT 13; PREEMPTION]

Plaintiff MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resources filed for declaratory and
injunctive relief under Act 13 against Cecil Township’s Unified Development Ordinance,
and related Zoning Hearing Board decision to deny special exception permit, for blocking
MarkWest’s proposal to build natural gas compression station in a light industrial zone.
Action pending.
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Rodriguez v. Krancer (M.D. Pa. filed July 27, 2012).
[ACT 13; FIRST AMENDMENT]

Plaintiff Dr. Rodriguez seeks declaratory relief from what petitioner calls the
Medical Gag Rule contained in Act 13 due to violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV. The provision at issue requires heath
professionals, upon request by O&G development company, to enter into confidentiality
agreements prior to receiving information regarding the chemical composition of fracking
fluid. Under the terms of the provision, the confidentiality agreements may reach doctors
communications with patients. Plaintiff alleges the regulation is an overbroad regulation
on speech which forces him to violate ethical and professional obligations of his
Pennsylvania medical license. Action pending.

Range Resources- Appalachia, LLC vs. Blaine Township, No. 09-355 (W.D. Pa., Oct.
29, 2009).
[ACT 13; PREEMPTION]

Range Resources Appalachia petitioned for damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief against Ordinances passed by Blaine Township. BLAINE TOWNSHIP, PA, An
Ordinance by the Second Class Township of Blaine Township, Washington County,
Pennsylvania, Eliminating Legal Powers and Privileges from Corporations Doing
Business Within Blaine Township to Vindicate the Right to Democratic SelfGovernance, O-007-2008 (Jul. 21, 2008) (hereinafter Corporate Rights Ordinance);
Blaine Township Corporate Disclosure and Environmental Protection Order, O-002-2008
(Apr. 21, 2008) (hereinafter Disclosure Ordinance); A Resolution of the Blaine Township
Board of Supervisors to Enact a $300.00 Permit Fee for Each Temporary Structure,
Storage or Office Trailer Used at All Work Sites, R-001-2008 (Mar. 17, 2008)
(hereinafter Temporary Structure Fee Resolution). Range Resources alleged that Blaine
Township’s Ordinances violate Constitutional provisions, constitute an impermissible
exercise of police power, and are preempted by state law.
The District Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and
invalidated all three Ordinances. The Disclosure Ordinance, requiring Corporations to
disclose information regarding operations within the Township and barring Corporations
on basis of previous criminal or civil violations, was invalidated as preempted by the
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act. Act of December 19, 1984, P.L. 1140 (as amended, 58
P.S. §§601.602). Specifically, the court cited application of the Disclosure Ordinance to
require that Range Resources disclose information regarding streets used in operations,
subcontractors, and hours of operations as evidence that the Ordinance imposed
additional requirements drilling operations. In addition to violating field preemption
implied by the Oil and Gas Act, the Disclosure Ordinance, also defeated the uniformity
goals of the Act. Citing Range Resources v. Salem Township, 964 A.2d 869 (Pa., 2009)
and Huntley & Huntley Inc. v. Borough Council of the Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d
855 (Pa., 2009). The District Court also invalidated the Corporate Rights Ordinance for
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violating the Supremacy Clause and the Temporary Fee Structure for unconstitutional
vagueness. Citing decision in Penn Ridge Coal, LLC v. Blaine Township, No. 08-1452
(W.D. Pa. Sep. 16, 2009) invalidating Blaine Township Corporate Rights Ordinance.

Berish v. Southwestern Energy Production Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61943 (M.D.
Pa., May 3, 2012).
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION]

Plaintiffs allege that oil and gas development companies involved in building and
operating a gas well within two thousand feet of water supply well are responsible for
the contamination of their water supply. Berish v. Southwestern Energy Prod. Co., 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61943 (M.D. Pa., May 3, 2012) granting Plaintiffs’ motion to file
amended complaint adding four Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that discharges
resulting from improper and insufficient well casing and spills contaminated Plaintiffs’
property, and underlying aquifers, with hazardous chemicals and industrial waste used in
the hydraulic fracturing process. Petitioners’ remaining claims include: negligence per se,
nuisance, strict liability, and trespass. Berish v. Southwestern Energy Co., 763 F. Supp.
2d 702 (M.D. Pa., Feb. 3, 2011) denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss strict liability
claim prior to discovery process.
Petitioners seek injunctive relief barring Defendants from drilling and production
activities and requiring abatement of alleged nuisances, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and costs of health monitoring for latent harms. Final disposition pending.

Dillon v. Antero Resources, No. 2:11-cv-01038, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95014 (W.D. Pa.
Jul. 10, 2012) consolidated with Becka v. Antero Resources, No.2:11-cv-01040 (W.D. Pa.
Jul. 10, 2012).
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION]

Plaintiffs Dillon family and Becka family, filing separate cases now consolidated
before the District Court, allege claims sounding in negligence, strict liability and
trespass against Antero Resources for groundwater pollution stemming from hydraulic
fracturing operations. Action pending.

Hallowich v. Range Resources Corporation, 2012 Pa. Super. 234U, (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec.
7, 2012) vacating Judgment of January 31, 2012, C-63-CV-201003954 (C.P. Washington
County Jan. 31, 2012) denying petitions of the Observer Publishing Company and PG
Publishing Company to intervene and to unseal the record.
[SEALED RECORD]

Underlying matter involved Plaintiff Hallowich’s tort claims against Range
Resources Corporation for damages resulting from hydraulic fracturing operations. In
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accordance with procedural rules governing settlement on behalf of minors, parties
reached a settlement agreement containing confidentiality provisions following a hearing
before the court. Parties also filed a joint motion to seal the record. Appellants in this
action, newspapers the Observer-Reporter and Post-Gazette, petitioned to intervene and
unseal the record. The newspapers argued that the sealing of the record violated the
constitutional presumption of openness in judicial proceedings and common law
requirements for a party to show that a parties interest in secrecy outweighs the
traditional presumption of openness. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I, PA. CONST. ART. I, §11, PA
Childcare LLC, 887 A.2d 311. The trial court denied Appellants’ petition on untimeliness
grounds arguing that the case had settled and was therefore no longer pending and subject
to intervention. PA. R. CIV. P. 2327.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the trial court’s denial of Appellants
petition to intervene and remanded for reconsideration. Citing scheduling inconsistencies
by the trial court that made the filing of a timely intervention impracticable, the Superior
Court held that the lower court should have liberally construed the timeliness rule and
accepted Appellants’ petitions to intervene.

Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil and Gas Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 119292 (M.D. Pa., Oct.
14, 2011) ; Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., F. Supp. 2d 506 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION; STRICT LIABILITY; MEDICAL MONITORING]

Plaintiffs, property owners in Dimock Pennsylvania, filed suit against Defendant
natural gas producers for injunctive relief and damages alleging contamination of land
and groundwater with methane, natural gas, and other toxins. Petitioners’ claims include
negligence, private nuisance, strict liability, breach of contract, fraudulent
misrepresentation, gross negligence, a claim under the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act, and the establishment of medical monitoring trust funds. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss HSCA, strict liability, medical monitoring trust fund, and gross
negligence claims and a motion to strike certain allegations in the complaint. The District
Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims except for gross negligence, which
is not recognized under Pennsylvania law, and denied Defendants’ motion to strike
allegations regarding damages. Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil and Gas Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 119292 (M.D. Pa., Oct. 14, 2011).
The District Courts rejection of Defendants’ motion to dismiss was significant for
their strict liability holding. While Pennsylvania case law has held that activities such as
operation of a pipeline are not abnormally dangerous activities that warrant strict liability,
the court argued that extension of such reasoning to gas-well drilling could not be
undertaken without the development of a more complete factual record. Id. citing Smith v.
Weaver, 665 A. 2d. 1215 (Pa. Super. 1995) for holding operation of an underground
storage tank at gasoline station not to be abnormally dangerous activity and Melso v. Sun
Pipe Line Co., 576 A.2d 999 (Pa. Super. 1990) for holding that operation of a petroleum
pipeline is not abnormally dangerous activity. Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion
to dismiss argues for a distinction between the storage and transmission of gas and
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petroleum products, classified under Pennsylvania common law as activities that are not
abnormally dangerous, and gas-well drilling and operations.
The court also ruled that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged plausible facts necessary to
support claim for medical monitoring funds in providing evidence of elevated levels of
dissolved methane in well water, pollutants and industrial waste discharged into ground
and waters near Plaintiffs’ homes and wells, the spilling of diesel fuel, drilling mud
discharged into diversion ditches near Plaintiffs’ homes and water wells, and three
significant spills of pollutants within the Dimock gas well area within a ten day period.
Plaintiffs also provided evidence of neurological, gastrointestinal, and dermatological
symptoms and blood samples consistent with toxic exposure.

Roth v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No.3:12-CV-00898 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2012)
[LONE PINE ORDER]

Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Roth, filed suit alleging property damage and
groundwater contamination from Defendants’ oil and gas operations in Dimock
Township and Springville Township. In addition to claims sounding in tort (negligence,
negligence per se, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability) Plaintiffs also allege violations
of the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, breach of contract, and fraudulent
misrepresentation. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602.101 et. seq. Central to claims are
allegations that Cabot Oil & Gas misrepresented their testing, prevention, and
remediation obligations regarding Plaintiffs’ water supply in executing a 2008 oil and gas
lease. Petitioners cite the release of methane gas into drinking water supply from
hydraulic fracturing operations and improperly constructed waste wells, the
contamination of groundwater with hazardous flowback water, DEP citations for
improper waste handling and well casing, and the DEP’s 2011 finding that elevated levels
of dissolved methane rendered the Roth’s water supply unsafe for human consumption.
Defendants moved for Lone Pine case management order arguing that Plaintiffs’
counsels involvement in the substantially similar case, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas,
pending in the Middle District of Pennsylvania since 2009 suggested they should be able
to produce evidence for claims at this stage in the litigation. The District Court rejected
Defendants’ motion for Lone Pine case management as the small number of plaintiffs and
the nature of the claims at issue here could be distinguished from the complex toxic tort
allegations involving multiple parties where discovery is likely to be particularly
protracted and expensive.
A key distinction recognized by the court is the use of Lone Pine orders in toxic tort cases
where complexity arises from plaintiffs medical claims and not from the number of
parties involved. Citing Strudley v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 2011-cv-2218 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Denver County May 9, 2012) Lone Pine order issued where Plaintiff alleged health
injuries from exposure to natural gas operations. In opposing Defendants’ motion,
Plaintiffs highlight that their Amended Complaint did not contain personal injury claims
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and was limited to property-related tort claims substantiated by DEP documentation of
Defendants operational defects and contamination.

Armstrong v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 10CV000681, (C.P. Bradford County,
Jul. 29, 2012); Pl.’s Amended Complaint, No. 10-2453 (M.D. Pa., Jan. 20, 2011); Pl.’s
Mot. to Remand, 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 2453; 2011 Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 836
(M.D. Pa., Mar. 4, 2012) citing lack of complete diversity jurisdiction.
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION]

Plaintiffs, property owners in Sugar Run Pennsylvania, filed suit alleging
groundwater contamination from Defendants’ natural gas extraction activities. Petitioners
aver that their potable water supply well was rendered unfit for use and that hazardous
contamination of property forced Plaintiffs to evacuate their homes. Plaintiffs allege
violations of the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act and seek relief for tort
claims sounding in negligence, nuisance, strict liability, and trespass. The suit, initially
removed to federal District Court on Defendants’ motion, was recently remanded to the
Court of Common Pleas in Bradford County for lack of complete diversity of parties
subsequent to the joinder of two Defendants in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 28 U.S.C.
1447(e); Pl.’s Amended Complaint, 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 2453 (Jan. 20, 2011).
Action pending.

Zimmerman v. Atlas America, LLC, No.2009-7564 (Ct. Comm. Pl. Washington County,
filed Sep.9, 2009).
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION]

Plaintiffs, George and Lisa Zimmerman, filed suit against Atlas America alleging
contamination of property in violation of an earlier Amended Settlement Agreement and
seeking damages for violations in tort. This action followed the Zimmerman’s earlier
effort to obtain an injunction barring Atlas America from accessing their property
pursuant to a mineral lease agreement. Zimmerman v. Atlas America, LLC, No.20085760, Ct. Comm. Pl. Washington County, Oct. 2008). The previous action culminated
with an Amended Settlement Agreement containing a Confidentiality Provision.
Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint complains of burning eyes, visible water pollution
downstream of natural gas well sites, and dead fish and animals. Zimmerman’s cite the
release of flowback water into rivers, burying of contaminated tarpaulin, and bubbling of
liquids in water pool adjacent to natural gas well casing. A 2008 report of water and soil
samples taken from the Zimmerman’s property revealed concentrations for arsenic and
tetrachloroethene in great excess of the EPAs Screening Levels for dangerous
contaminants. Pl.’s Compl. ¶20. Petitioners have alleged the following claims sounding
in tort: negligence, res ipsa loquitor, trespass, nuisance, and negligence per se. The
Zimmermans also claim Atlas America’s breach of contract warrants compensatory
damages, calculated pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement at $16,000.00 for
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each acre disturbed, plus the loss of profits from farm and the loss of property value. Pl.’s
Compl. ¶67, 73. Action pending.

Kamuck v. Shell Energy Holdings GP, No. 4:11-CV-1425, 2012 WL 1463594 (M.D. Pa.,
Mar. 19, 2012).
[STRICT LIABILITY]

Plaintiff, landowner Edward Kamuck, filed suit against Shell Energy and related
Defendants for harms allegedly caused by hydraulic fracturing operations on neighboring
property. Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted for all of Kamuck’s contract claims
and for some tort claims. However, the court maintained Kamuck’s claims sounding in
negligence, private nuisance, and strict liability. Citing Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil and Gas
Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 119292 (M.D. Pa., Oct. 14, 2011); Berish v. Southwestern
Energy Production Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61943 (M.D. Pa., May 3, 2012); and
Tucker v. Southwestern Energy Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20697, No.1:11-cv-44-DPM,
No.1:11-cv-45-DPM (E. D. Ark., Feb. 17, 2012) for proposition that strict liability claim
requires factual analysis following adequate development of the record. In maintaining
the private nuisance claim, the court cited the release and spraying of toxic hydraulic
fracturing fluids.

Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future v. Ultra Resources, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-1360 (M.D.
Pa. Sep. 24, 2012)
[CITIZEN SUIT; CLEAN AIR ACT]

Plaintiff Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future filed citizen suit under the Clean Air
Act (CAA) against Ultra Resources Inc. for failing to receive a Nonattainment New
Source Review permit prior to building multiple compressor stations. 42 U.S.C.
§7604(a)(3); 25 Pa. Code §127.201. Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future argue that
compressor stations must be considered in the aggregate to constitute a Major Emitting
Facility for NOx emissions. Defendant Ultra Resources maintains that each compressor
station is properly authorized pursuant to receiving GP-5 general permits for construction
of natural gas facilities from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection.
35 P.S. § 4006.1. The District Court’s September 2012 interim order found subject-matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s citizen suit claim that Defendant failed to obtain a required
permit under part D of the Clean Air Act. Citing Ogden Projects v. New Morgan Landfill
Co., 911 F. Supp.863 (E.D.Pa. 1966) and Weiler v. Chatham Forest Products, Inc., 392
F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 2004) holding complaint alleging failure by Defendant to obtain a class
C or D permit for a major emissions facility sufficient for subject-matter jurisdiction.
The court declined to exercise Burford abstention, arguing that as Plaintiff’s claim
did not require review of the State regulatory scheme but rather requested review of a
particular discretionary act Burford abstention was inapplicable. The court also held that
Plaintiff was not required to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing the
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claim in federal court. Following Weiler v. Chatham supra.; distinguished from Sierra
Club v. Wellington Dev., LLC, No.0893 (W.D. Pa May 13, 2008).
A key factual inquiry not yet addressed is whether emissions from Ultra
Resources compressor stations, each of which emits less than the one hundred ton per
year threshold for Major Emitting Sources under the CAA, should be aggregated into one
Major Emitting Facility and subject to a NNSR or regulated separately by state issued
permits as in the status quo.

Clean Water Action v. Municipal Authority of The City of McKeesport, No.
2:2011cv00940 (W.D. Pa., 2011)
[CITIZEN SUIT; CLEAN WATER ACT]

Plaintiffs Clean Water Action and Three Rivers Waterkeeper filed citizen suit
under the Clean Water Act against Municipal Authority of McKeesport (MACM) for the
discharge of oil and gas wastewaters without a required permit and for violations of
MACM’s existing NPDES permit and pretreatment violations. 33 U.S.C. § 1365; 33
U.S.C. §1311(a); Permit No. PA0026913; 33 U.S.C. §1317. Defendant MACM, a sewage
treatment facility regulated as a publicly owned treatment works under the CAA, was
alleged to discard industrial wastes from natural gas drilling operations without seeking
NPDES modifications for the resulting change in waste stream pollutants. 33 U.S.C.
§1342(k)(2011). 40 C.F.R §§122.62,122.63, 123.25(a)(25).
Parties settled April 10, 2012 with MACM stating that, although they no longer
took natural gas well waste water, they would seek an NPDES permit before handling
coal bed methane or shale gas wastewaters in the future. Patrick Cloonan, “Settlement
Ends Shale Water Legal Fight” McKeesport Daily News (May 2, 2012).
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OHIO
Boggs v. Landmark 4, LLC, No. 1:12CV614 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 12, 2012);(consolidating
Mangan v. Landmark 4, LLC, Boggs v. Landmark 4, LLC, 2012 WL 3485288 (N.D.
Ohio, Aug. 13, 2012). Pl.’s Compl. 2012 WL 960913.
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION]

Plaintiffs, William and Stephanie Boggs, allege groundwater contamination with
toxic and hazardous chemicals as a result of Defendant Landmark 4 LLC’s natural gas
wells located within 2,500 feet of the Boggs’s residence. The complaint cites the
insufficient cement casing of wells and discharges and spills of industrial waste resulting
from Landmark’s negligence as sources of contamination with barium, manganese, and
strontium. In addition to permanent and preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiffs seek
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and the costs of future health monitoring.
Plaintiffs’ complaint cites the following causes of action: negligence, strict liability,
nuisance, negligence per se, unjust enrichment, battery, and intentional fraudulent
concealment, and negligent misrepresentation. Defendant prevailed on a motion to
dismiss claims for intentional fraudulent concealment and battery. Boggs v. Landmark 4,
LLC, 2012 WL 3485288 (N.D. Ohio, Aug. 13, 2012). Action pending.
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TEXAS
Mitchell v. Encana Oil & Gas USA, Inc., No. 10-2555 (N.D. Tex.);
2012 U.S. Dist. Motions 2555; 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 841 (N.D. Tex., Apr.
14, 2011). Pl. Comp., 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 2555; 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings
LEXIS 5979 (N.D. Tex., Dec. 15, 2010).
[WASTE DISPOSAL RESERVE PITS; SETTLEMENT]

Plaintiff, Grace Mitchell, filed suit against Encana Oil & Gas and subsidiaries of
Chesapeake Energy alleging groundwater contamination from Defendants’ hydraulic
fracturing operations and disposal activities in vicinity of her property. Mitchell cited
groundwater tests revealing contamination with various chemicals, including diesel range
hydrocarbons, in support of her claim that well water is not fit for household use or
consumption. Pl. Comp., 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 2555; 2010 U.S. Dist. Ct.
Pleadings LEXIS 5979 (N.D. Tex., Dec. 15, 2010). Mitchell’s First Amended Complaint
asserted the following claims: nuisance, trespass, negligence, and exposure to toxic
chemicals warranting medical monitoring damages. 2012 U.S. Dist. Motions 2555; 2011
U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 841 (N.D. Tex., Apr. 14, 2011).The case was dismissed
December 27, 2011 pursuant to settlement.

Scoma v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 10-CV-1385 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010). Settled
December 9, 2011.
[WASTE DISPOSAL RESERVE PITS]

Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Scoma, filed suit against Chesapeake Energy alleging
contamination from drilling waste disposal injection wells and other disposal sites.
The Scomas’ complaint reports they were no longer able to use their supply well due to
contamination and cited water testing results showing increased concentration of the
petroleum byproducts benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene, barium, and iron. Pls.’
Second Amended Compl. Aug. 11, 2010. Claims for nuisance, negligence, and trespass
were dismissed pursuant to settlement.

Harris v. Devon Energy Production Company, 2012 WL 6082415; No.12-40137 (5th
Cir. Dec.7, 2012) affirming dismissal but modifying to be with prejudice, Harris v.
Devon Energy Production Company, No. 4:10cv708; 2012 WL 220212 (E.D. Tex., Jan.
25, 2012) granting Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice subsequent to
Recommendations of United States Magistrate Judge, 2011 WL 7092649 (E.D. Tex. Dec.
9, 2011).
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION]

Plaintiffs, Doug and Diana Harris, filed suit against Defendant Devon Energy
Production alleging trespass and negligence resulting in contamination of Plaintiffs’
groundwater. The Harris’s Amended Complaint cited the presence of a gray substance
28

containing chemicals and substances typically found in drilling mud, pointing in
particular to a commercial compound called “bentonite”, as evidence of Devon Energy
Production’s responsibility. Pl.s’ Amended Compl. at 6, docket # 24. Following
Defendant’s second motion for summary judgment in November 2011, Plaintiffs moved
for voluntary dismissal without prejudice stating “even though testing showed toxic
contamination in Plaintiffs’ well water when this lawsuit was filed in December 2010,
recent testing showed that the contamination is no longer at a toxic level for human
consumption.”. FRCP 41(a)(2).
The District Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for dismissal without prejudice.
Devon Energy prevailed on an appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for
modification of the judgment to be with prejudice. In an en banc decision, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the unconditional dismissal of the suit caused Defendant prejudice by
preventing Devon from obtaining a ruling on its motion for summary judgment. Devon’s
second motion for summary judgment presented evidence that a Texas Railroad
Commission investigation had failed to find contamination of the well prior to the filing
of the suit, a down hole video of Harris’s water well showing that well casing had
deteriorated and allowed aquifer sediment to flow into the well, and expert evidence that
its activity could not have caused contamination of the well. In responding to an order to
respond to the motion for summary judgment, the Harris’s conceded that they could not
prove that Devon was the cause of alleged contamination. The Court of Appeals cited the
weakness of Plaintiffs’ original evidence and the Harris’s concession that they could not
prove contamination as reasons to conclude that their motion for voluntary dismissal was
intended to avoid an imminent adverse result of summary judgment and was sufficient to
amount to plain legal prejudice against Defendant.

Lipsky v. Range Resources et. al., NO. CV11-0798 (Dist. Ct. Parker County)
Lipsky v. Range Resources et. al. v. Rich, NO. CV11-0798 (filed July 14, 2011) Lipsky v.
Range Production Company, No. 02-12-00098-CV, 2012 WL 3600014 (Ct. App. Tex.
Aug. 23, 2012) rejecting appeal of dismissal of Plaintiffs Anti-Slapp Motion to Dismiss
Range’s Counter Claims for lack of jurisdiction..
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION; DEFAMATION]

Plaintiffs, Steven and Shlya Lipsky, filed suit sounding in tort against Range
Resources and other Defendants allegedly responsible for well water contamination
through hydraulic fracturing operations on two natural gas wells. A related Imminent and
Substantial Endangerment Order enforcement action against Range, brought by the EPA
under the Safe Drinking Water Act, was dismissed pursuant to a joint motion for
dismissal following EPA’s withdrawal of the Endangerment Order. U.S. v. Range
Production Company, No. 3:11-CV-00116-F (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2012) granting joint
dismissal without prejudice.
The case is notable for conspiracy and defamation counter-claims brought by
Range against Lipsky’s and third-party, anti-fracking activist, Alisa Rich. Range’s
petition alleges a conspiracy between Lipsky’s and Rich to skew contamination testing
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results and induce EPA action against Range. Range has requested three million in
damages and additional punitive damages for loss of reputation to their business as a
result of negative media coverage. Final disposition of both Lipsky’s underlying suit and
Range’s countersuit is pending.
Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint in November 2012 and the suit remain
on the Parker Country trial court’s docket. Rich and Lipskys’ motion to dismiss Range
Resrouces counterclaims for violation of the Texas statute against Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation was rejected by the trial court and an appellate court that
declined jurisdiction over the appeal. Lipsky v. Range Production Company, No. 02-1200098-CV, 2012 WL 3600014 (Ct. App. Tex. Aug. 23, 2012) rejecting Plaintiffs’ appeal
of trial courts dismissal of Anti-Slapp Motion to Dismiss Range’s Counter Claims for
lack of jurisdiction; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §27.003(a) (West Supp. 2012).
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WEST VIRGINIA
Northeast Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411 (W. Va. Cir. Ct.
Monongalia Co., Aug. 12, 2012).
[PREEMPTION; MUNICIPAL LAND USE POWERS]

Plaintiffs Northeast Natural Energy and Enrout Properties filed suit alleging the
West Virginia Oil and Gas Act preempted Morgantown City’s Ordinance banning the use
of hydraulic fracturing methods to extract oil or gas within one mile of the City limits. W.
VA. CODE §22-1-1, et seq. (1994); MORGANTOWN, W. VA., ORDINANCES 721.01 et seq.
(June 21, 2011) (hereinafter Ordinance). Morgantown City defended the Ordinance as a
legitimate response to nuisances endemic to the hydraulic fracturing process within the
scope of Home Rule powers conferred by the state. W.VA. CODE §8-12-2 (1969). The
Circuit Court in Monongalia County invalidated Morgantown’s Ordinance on preemption
grounds and hold that the state Oil and Gas Act comprehensively regulated the field of
Oil and Gas development with no exception carved out for municipalities to act in
conjunction with the state.
Guided by West Virginia precedent narrowly circumscribing municipal powers
except where there has been a clear delegation of authority, the court held that the
comprehensive regulatory framework of the Oil and Gas Act and the lack of an explicit
exception for local regulation of nuisances demonstrated the legislature’s intent to
preempt municipal regulation such as Morgantown City’s Ordinance.

Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No.5:11CV5; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153509; 43
ELR 20230 (N.D. W. Va., Oct. 25, 2012)
[WASTE DISPOSAL RESERVE PITS; TRESPASS]

Teel family sought injunctive and compensatory relief for surface contamination
allegedly stemming from subsurface owner Chesapeake Appalachia’s disposal of drill
cuttings, mud, and process fluids from natural gas well operations in waste pits. At the
time of the District Court’s final disposition of the case only Teel’s claim for trespass
remained. The central question in settling the trespass claim was whether, as a matter of
law, Chesapeake Appalachia’s disposal of waste in drilling pits constituted a fairly
necessary use of the surface estate in the appropriate exercise of subsurface rights
pursuant to the mineral lease and not imposing a substantial burden on surface owner.
The District Court held that Chesapeake was not liable for trespass
The court held that, although not dispositive of Plaintiffs’ common law claims,
West Virginia drilling permits and applicable regulations allowing the use of waste
disposal pits on-site suggests that Chesapeake’s disposal activities were necessary and
reasonable. W. Va. Code § 22-6-30(a), 22-6A-1 et. seq. (specifically, citing 2(a)(3) for
its discussion of pits to contain waste) (West Virginia Horizontal Well Control Act).
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Although Plaintiffs demonstrated that closed-loop disposal systems were a reasonable
alternative, and had recently been adopted as standard practice by Chesapeake, the court
rejected the expansion of common law holding that permanent waste disposal pursuant to
mineral extraction constituted a trespass on surface owner’s land. Citing Whiteman v.
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:11CV31, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78876 (N.D. W.
Va., Jun. 7, 2012) and Kartch v. EOG Res., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 995, 2012 WL 661978
(D. N.D. 2012).

Hagy v. Equitable Production, No. 2:10-cv-01372, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91773 (S.D.
W. Va., Jun. 29, 2012)
[GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION]

Hagy family filed suit alleging property damage and personal injury from
contamination with hazardous chemicals during Defendants’, oil and gas production
companies and service providers, drilling and operation of wells on Plaintiffs property.
As of June 2012, Plaintiffs claims of negligence, nuisance, strict liability and trespass
against all four Defendants had been dismissed on motions for summary judgment or
settlement agreements. Defendant Equitable Production (EQT), owner of the wells in
question, prevailed on a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs
relinquished all claims pursuant to two releases entered into with EQT. Hagy v. Equitable
Production, No. 2:10-cv-01372, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69438 (S.D. W. Va., May 17,
2012) The first release, providing consideration of nineteen thousand dollars, released
Equitable Production from all property claims arising out of drilling operations. Id.
Agreement and Release of October 22, 2007. The second settlement agreement,
providing ten thousand dollars in consideration, was signed in April 2008 after the Hagy
family first began to observe changes in their well water and resulting physical
symptoms. Second Agreement and Release of April 23, 2008. Plaintiffs aver that tests
performed following degradation in quality and quantity of well water showed increase in
levels of iron and manganese. Pls.’ Resp. Opp. Mot. Summ. J. at 4. In granting Defendant
BJ Services motion for summary judgment on negligence and nuisance claims the court
noted that claims against all four initial Defendants had been disposed of. Hagy v.
Equitable Production, No. 2:10-cv-01372, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91773 (S.D. W. Va.,
Jun. 29, 2012) granting summary judgment for insufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of material fact on negligence, trespass, and nuisance claims against BJ Services.

Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
[TRESPASS]

Plaintiff Salinas family, mineral lessor owning land situated above the Vicksburg
T formation, filed suit against lessee Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation for damages
allegedly resulting from drainage from hydraulic fracturing operations on a neighboring
parcel. Following Coastal Oil’s appeal from unfavorable trial and appeals court decisions,
the Texas Supreme Court reviewed Coastal Oil’s liability and damages verdicts on claims
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for subsurface trespass, breach of implied covenant to protect against drainage, breach of
implied development covenant, and bad faith pooling.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the rule of capture precludes trespass claims
for hydraulically fractured wells alleged to drain gas beneath Plaintiff’s property. While
mineral lessors were held to have cognizable interests, either in the form of loss of value
to the reversion or reduced royalty revenues, warranting standing for trespass claims such
claims were preempted by the rule of capture and Texas Railroad Commission
Regulations. The court also rejected the finding that Coastal Oil was liable for implied
covenant to protect from drainage for lack of evidence that a reasonably prudent operator
should have prevented draining. Coastal Oil’s liability for breach of implied development
covenant and bad faith pooling was upheld. A new trial was ordered as the jury’s
expansive assessment of damages was seen as evidence of harmful prejudice against
Coastal Oil as a result of Plaintiff’s submission of an internal memorandum containing a
discriminatory statement.
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ACTIONS INVOLVING FEDERAL AGENCIES
Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, Nos. 09-4348;10-4572 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 2012).
[CLEAN AIR ACT]

Plaintiff Summit Petroleum challenged EPA’s final determination that natural gas
sweetening plant, sour gas producing well sites, and flares aggregately constituted a
major stationary source requiring a Clean Air Act Title V operating permit. 42 U.S.C.
§§7661-7661f. Following Summit’s request for a source determination the EPA
interpreted relevant regulations and guidance documents to find that, despite geographic
distribution of plants over roughly forty-three square miles, SO2 and NOx emissions
should be aggregated and regulated as a single source. The parties agreed that Summit
met two of three regulatory criteria for aggregation but disagreed on EPA’s interpretation
of “adjacent” in the requirement that pollutant emitting activities must be “located on one
or more contiguous or adjacent properties.” 40 C.F.R. §71.2. EPA guidance documents
were interpreted in determining that the degree of interdependence between Summits’
multiple emitting sites justified aggregating sites despite the lack of physical proximity.
The Circuit Court denied the EPA’s decision deference and ruled that the consideration
of the interrelatedness of sources as a proxy for proximity contravened the unambiguous
meaning of adjacent, regulatory history, and the EPA’s own guidance documents.

New York v. US Army Corps of Engineers, 11-CV-2599 (E.D.N.Y Sep. 24, 2012).
[NEPA]

New York and multiple non-governmental organizations filed suit against various
federal agencies, the Delaware River Basin Commission, and the Army Corps of
Engineers alleging NEPA violations. With DRBC issuance of regulations regarding
natural gas drilling still pending, Plaintiffs alleged that failure to complete an EIS
regarding the potential impacts of natural gas drilling violated NEPA requirements as
applied to DRBC and other federal agencies. The District Court granted Defendants
motion to dismiss on the grounds that in the absence of final action their were neither
cognizable injuries to New York’s propriety rights nor to NGO members enjoyment
rights.

Coalition for Responsible Growth & Sustainable Development v. FERC, 12-566ag (2d
Cir., Jun. 2012).
[NEPA]

Petitioners, a coalition of environmental organizations, challenged the
Environmental Assessment performed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
prior to allowing Central New York Oil and Gas Company to build and operate a 39 mile
natural gas pipeline in Pennsylvania. Natural Gas Act 15 U.S.C §717f(c). Petitioners
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claimed FERC’s EA inadequately assessed the cumulative impact of the project by
failing to consider the impacts of the development of the Marcellus shale natural gas as
part of the impacts of pipeline development. FERC’s EA cited the fact that natural gas
development on the Marcellus shale was not sufficiently causally related to the project to
warrant consideration in the cumulative impacts. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals issued
a summary order dismissing the action and upholding FERC’s Environmental
Assessment for compliance with NEPA requirements.

Independent Petroleum Association of America v. EPA, No.10-1233 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
[SDWA]

Plaintiffs challenged EPA’s posting on Agency website stating that wells using
diesel fuels as a hydraulic fracturing additive would be considered Class II wells for
regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Underground Injection Control permitting
program. 40 C.F.R. §144.6 defining Class II Wells as “wells which inject fluids…[f]or
enhanced recovery of oil or natural gas.” Under a February 2012 settlement agreement,
the EPA agreed to delete the statement that “Injection wells receiving diesel fuel as a
hydraulic fracturing additive will be considered Class II wells by the UIC program” in
favor of a statement referring to the EPA’s draft “Permitting Guidance for Oil and Gas
Hydraulic Fracturing Activities Using Diesel Fuels”.

Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Management, No.11-CV-6174 (N.D.
Cal., filed Dec. 8, 2011).
[NEPA]

Petitioners Center for Biological Diversity and Sierra Club seek declaratory and
injunctive relief for NEPA and Mineral Leasing Act violations related to BLM’s decision
to lease 2,700 acres in California for oil and gas development. The complaint alleges
BLM violated NEPA requirements by failing to include the impacts of oil and gas
development and the hydraulic fracturing process in assessing the cumulative
environmental impacts of the proposed pipeline. 42 U.S.C. §§4321. Petitioners also
allege violations of the resource waste provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act for BLM’s
failure to regulate methane emissions from permitted gas wells. 30 U.S.C. §§181, 225.

Bear Lake Properties LLC, UIC Appeal No. 11-03 (EPA Envtl. Appeals Bd., Jun. 28,
2012).
[SDWA]

Petitioners requested review of Underground Injection Control permits issued to
Bear Lake Properties by the EPA. The decision to issue the Class II permits for storage of
wastewater related to oil and gas development was challenged for deficiencies in
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assessing threats to water wells in the “area of review” around the proposed sites. 40
C.F.R. §146.6 setting regulatory criteria for establishing area of review. The
Environmental Appeals Board remanded the permits for reconsideration and cited EPA’s
failure to articulate how they had satisfied all regulatory obligations related to threats to
drinking water wells in the area of review around Bear Lake Properties proposed
injection wells. 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.31(e)(7), 146.24(a).

Impact Energy Resources v. Salazar, 693 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2012).
[NEPA]

Petitioners, companies that submitted high bids on oil and gas leases at a BLM
auction of land in Utah, appeal lower court decisions upholding Secretary of the Interior
Salazar’s decision not to lease parcels subsequent to auction but prior to lease issuance.
Contested parcels were removed from the leasing process by Secretary Salazar following
D.C. District Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order on the leasing of seventy
seven parcels for likely NEPA and FLPMA violations. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Allred, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 30664 (D.D.C. Jan 17, 2009). The 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld dismissal of the suit as time-barred under the Mineral Leasing Act. Citing
30 U.S.C. §226-2 setting ninety day window for actions contesting Secretary’s decision’s
involving oil and gas leases.

S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Allred, No.: 08-2187, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 30664
(D.D.C. Jan 17, 2009). S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Lewis, 845 F. Supp.2d 231 (D.D.C.
2012).
[NEPA]

Plaintiffs, non-governmental organizations, sought a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction to prevent BLM from leasing seventy-seven parcels of land
for oil and gas development. Petitioners alleged NEPA, National Historic Preservation
Act, and Federal Land Policy and Management Act violations for BLM’s failure to
account for air pollution and other environmental effects from oil and gas development.
42 USC §4332, 16 U.S.C. §470(f), 43 U.S.C. 1712(c)(8). The DC Circuit Court granted
the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction citing the likelihood that
Plaintiffs would succeed on NEPA, NHPA, and FLPMA claims. Following the decision,
Secretary of the Interior Salazar withdrew the parcels at issue from the leasing process.
Impact Energy Resources v. Salazar, No.11-4043, 11-4057(D. Utah, Feb. 17, 2010)
challenging Secretary’s authority to withdraw parcels following auction.
The case was transferred to the District Court for resolution of Plaintiff’s
underlying claims challenging three resource management plans issued by BLM for
millions of acres of public lands in Utah. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Lewis, 845 F.
Supp.2d 231 (D.D.C. 2012).
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Minard Run Oil Company v. United States Forest Service, 42 ELR 20190, (W.D. Pa. Sep.
6, 2012); Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Service, 670 F.3d 236 (3rd Cir. 2011)
upholding Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Service, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116520,
2009 WL 4937785 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
[NEPA]

Petitioners, private parties holding mineral rights on federal land in Alleghany
National Forest, sought to make permanent a preliminary injunction enjoining the USFS
from regulating actions of mineral estate holders outside of restrictions expressly stated in
conveyances. The preliminary injunction issued in an earlier decision held that USFS’s
performance of an underlying settlement would cause Plaintiffs irreparable harm as
NEPA analysis had not been completed. The 3rd Circuit Court overturned the preliminary
injunction holding that as a matter of law USFS was not required to comply with NEPA.
The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment
for Plaintiffs, vacated the settlement, and established precedential effect for matters of
law resolved by third circuit in Minard III but denied Plaintiffs claim for permanent
injunctive relief.

U.S. v. Range Production Company, No. 3:11-CV-00116-F (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2012)
granting joint dismissal without prejudice; United States v. Range Production Company,
793 F. Supp. 2d 814 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 20, 2011) staying litigation pending resolution of
related action Range Resources Corporation et. al. v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, No. 11-60040 (5th Cir. filed Jan. 20, 2011).
[SDWA]

The EPA filed for injunctive relief and civil penalties against Range Production
for failure to comply with a Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Imminent and Substantial
Endangerment Order stemming from Defendants’ operation of two hydraulically
fractured wells on the Barnett Shale. 42 U.S.C. 300i; Imminent and Substantial
Endangerment Order Docket No. SDWA-06-2011-1208 (hereinafter Administrative
Order). EPA’s finding of health threatening levels of methane and benzene in domestic
water wells belonging to Hayley and Lipsky families formed the basis of the
Administrative Order and present civil enforcement action. The Texas Railroad
Commission’s investigation pursuant to Lipskys’ complaint in August 2010 resulted in
the a finding that Range did not contribute to or cause the contamination. Related civil
actions include Range Resources challenge to EPA’s enforcement authority before the 5th
Circuit Court, the Lipskys’ tort suit against Range for groundwater contamination, and
Range Resources counterclaim against the Lipskys alleging improper influence on EPA
officials. Range Resources Corporation et. al. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, No. 11-60040 (5th Cir. filed Jan. 20, 2011). In its motion for dismissal Range
argued that EPA’s efforts to collect financial penalties without proving that Range
actually caused well contamination, or providing Range with an opportunity to challenge
the EPA’s findings before a neutral arbitrator, constituted a due process violation.
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The District Court rejected Defendants’ motion to dismiss and issued a litigation
stay pending the Fifth Circuits resolution of whether EPA’s issuance of the Emergency
Order was arbitrary or capricious in related action Range Resources Corporation et. al. v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency. United States v. Range Production
Company, 793 F. Supp. 2d 814 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 20, 2011). The 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals heard oral arguments on Range’s Petition for Review of the Emergency Order in
October 2011. In March 2012 EPA withdrew the Administrative Order and parties agreed
to immediately seek dismissal of both actions. U.S. v. Range, No. 3:11-CV-00116-F
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2012) Joint Stipulation of Dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B).
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APPENDIX
Cases reported in the press but not included in this digest:
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, No. 12-1405 (D.C.C. filed Oct. 15, 2012)
Baker v. Anschutz Exploration Corp.,No.10-cv-61190 (W.D. NY)
Beckman v. EXCO Resources Inc., No. 11-00617 (W.D. La.)
Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum Inc., No. 11CV0474(E.D. Ark.)
Heinkel-Wolfe v. Williams Production Co., No. 10-40355-362 (Tex. Dist. Ct.)
Knoll v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. 2010-10345-16 (Tex. Dist. Ct.)
Koonce v. Chesapeake Exploration LLC, No. 12-CV-0736 (N.D. Ohio)
Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, No. 11-01650 (Dallas Co. Ct, filed Mar. 8, 2011)
Sizelove v. Williams Production Co., No.10-50355-367 (Denton Co. Ct., 2010)
Smith v. Devon Energy Production, No. 4:2011cv00104 (N.D. Tex., filed Mar.7, 2011)
Southwest Royalties, Inc. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-09-004284 (Tex. Dist. Ct., filed Apr.
30, 2012)
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